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1EcENT CASES
The moral code of mankind was not enacted and it cannot be amended
by legislatures.14
In view of the above discussion, it would seem that the Kentucky
Court in the McAfee case followed the better reasoned cases in holding
that a conviction under the federal income tax statute for willfully
failing to make a federal income tax return did not involve moral
turpitude in disbarment proceedings. However, it appears that the
court erred in failing to consider that, though the minimum require-
ments for a conviction did not involve moral turpitude per se, the facts
and circumstances under which the conviction was obtained may have
involved moral turpitude. This short-sighted holding by the court,
which it followed in a later decision,15 might permit a person convicted
for violation of the federal income tax laws under any circumstances
to continue the practice of law in Kentucky. On this basis, the holding
of the principle case is unsound in theory and in practice.
Wilbur D. Short
PLEADING-WHEN Is AN AcrioN COMMNCED?-On January 2, 1956,
plaintiff, a resident of Virginia, was injured in an automobile collision
in Kentucky involving defendant, a Kentucky resident. On December
31, 1956, plaintiff's attorney filed a complaint with the deputy clerk
of the United States District Court for the Edstern District of Kentucky.
The attorney submitted typed copies of the summons, along with the
complaint, and suggested to the clerk that she issue the summons that
day. However, the clerk did not issue the summons until January 3,
1957. Defendant interposed the statute of limitations as a defense,'
arguing that the cause of action did not accrue within one year next
before the commencement of the action since the Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure require the filing of a complaint and issuance of sum-
mons for the commencement of an action.2 Held: Since failure to
issue the summons was due solely to a matter over which the plaintiff
had no control, and since he had done everything humanly possible to
cause the summons to be issued, the cause of action was saved. Hagy
v. Allen, 153 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Ky. 1957).
14 Id. at 6.
15 Kentucky State Bar Association v. Brown, 302 S.W. 2d 834 (Ky. 1957).
1 Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 413.140 (1959) provides that an action for an injury to
the person of the plaintiff shall be commenced within one year after the cause of
action accrued. '2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 3 (1953) provides: "A civil action
is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court and the issuance of a
summons or warning order thereon in good faith."
1959]
KENTUcKY LAW JoURNAL
This case points up an important difference between the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure as
respects the commencement of an action. Federal Civil Rule 3 pro-
vides that an action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court. Kentucky Civil Rule 3 provides that an action is commenced
by the filing of a complaint with the court and the issuance of a sum-
mons in good faith.8 While plaintiff brought the action in Federal
Court, the commencement of an action is a matter of substantive law,4
and under the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkins,5 the substantive law of
the state must be applied.
Plaintiff had clearly complied with the first requirement of Ken-
tucky Civil Rule 3. The question is thus presented as to the extent to
which a plaintiff must accept responsibility for the issuance of a sum-
mons. Kentucky Civil Rule 4.01 provides that upon filing of the com-
plaint the clerk shall forthwith issue the required summons. Thus, it
would appear that once the complaint is filed with the clerk, the duty
of the plaintiff is fulfilled and an action should be deemed com-
menced.
6
While the court does not insist that the summons reach the sheriff
within a year after the cause of action accrues, it appears to require
that the summons actually be issued. Under the forerunner of the
present rule,7 issuance of a summons meant ". . . going out of the
hands of the clerk, express or implied, to be delivered to the sheriff for
service."" Thus, it was held that the process was issued where sum-
mons was: (1) placed in the hands of plaintiff's attorney,9 (2) left in
the hands of the clerk,' 0 and (3) placed in a chute, as was customary,
for the sheriff to pick up." The test in such cases as to whether sum-
mons has issued is whether the parties have acted in good faith.
Filing petition without causing summons to issue on it does not toll
the statute of limitations. 12 The filing of a petition and directing of
3 The form of Ky. Civ. Rule 3 was controlled in part by Ky. Rev. Stat. see.
413.250 (1959) which provides: "An action shall be deemed to commence on the
date of the first summons or process issued in good faith from the court having
jurisdiction of the cause of action."
4 Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
5 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6 Clay, Kentucky Civil Rules 11 (1954).
7 Kentucky Code of Civil Practice sec. 89 (1948) provided: "An action is
commenced by filing ... a petition... and,.., by causing a summons to be
issued, or a warning order to be made thereon."
8 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Little, 264 Ky. 579, 583-84, 95 S.W. 2d 253, 255
(1936), quoting from Webster v. Sharpe, 116 N.C. 466, 468, 21 S.E. 912, 914
(1895).
9 Rucker's Admr. v. Roadway Express, Inc., 279 Ky. 707, 131 S.W. 2d 840
(1939).
10 Blue Grass Mining Co. v. Stamper 267 Ky. 643, 103 S.W. 2d 112 (1937).
11 Blackburn v. Louisville, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1716, 55 S.W. 1075 (1900).
12 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Napier, 230 Ky. 323, 19 S.W. 2d 997, 999 (1929).
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the clerk to issue the summons is not the commencement of an action
if no summons is actually issued.13 The action is commenced for all
purposes when the first summons is issued.
14
Since the clerk made no effort to issue the summons until the 3rd
of January 1957, both statute and case law required that the plaintiff
lose his cause of action. However, the court's ruling that the action
should be considered as commenced prior to the actual issuance of the
summons would be a desirable modification of the present law for two
reasons. First, Kentucky Civil Rule 12.01 provides that the defendant
shall have twenty days after service of summons upon him to answer.
Thus, since the time for answer is measured, not from time of is-
suance of the summons, but from time of service, there is no prejudice
to the defendant's ability to answer if the action is deemed to com-
mence from the time the complaint is filed. Secondly, the plaintiff's
attorney should be able to rely on the clerk's complying with the Rule
of Procedure which commanded her to "forthwith issue the required
summons."15 Here, plaintiff's attorney suggested that she issue the
summons immediately and even supplied her with the necessary papers,
requiring only her signature. It was impossible for the attorney to
compel her to do more without physical force.
The Federal Rules Committee rejected the notion, which was
added to Rule 8 by the Kentucky Rules Committee, that issuance of
summons should commence the action. It would have been better had
Kentucky followed the Federal Rule, thereby permitting Rule 8 to be
construed with Rule 4.01 (requiring that the clerk issue a summons
forthwith). Then, omission to act by the clerk could not possibly be
attributed to the plaintiff, requiring a strained interpretation of Rule 3
to avoid injustice. However, the Kentucky Rules Committee could not
abrogate the requirement of Kentucky Revised Statutes Section 413.140
that a summons be issued to commence the action. Therefore, instead
of straining the Kentucky cases to permit plaintiff to bring the action,
the court should have simply recognized the rule requiring an issuance
of a summons and left it to the legislature to remedy the inherent in-
justice of the rule.
Billy R. Paxton
13 Casey v. Newport Rolling Mill Co., 156 Ky. 623, 161 S.W. 528, 530 (1913).
14 Ideal Savings Loan and Building Assn. of Newport, Ky. v. Town of Park
Hills, 281 Ky. 571, 136 S.W. 2d 748 (1940).
15 Ky. R. Civ. P. 4.01.
1959]
